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SRAM-based fingerprinting uses deviations in power-up behaviour caused by the CMOS fabrication process to identify distinct
devices. This method is a promising technique for unique identification of physical devices. In the case of SRAM-based hardware
reconfigurable devices such as FPGAs, the integrated SRAM cells are often initialized automatically at power-up, sweeping potential
identification data. We demonstrate an approach to utilize unused parts of configuration memory space for device identification.
Based on a total of over 200,000 measurements on nine Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs, we show that the retrieved values have promising
properties with respect to consistency on one device, variety between diﬀerent devices, and stability considering temperature
variation and aging.
1. Introduction
Identification of devices is a primitive that plays a crucial
role for a number of applications, including authentication
of devices and protection against cloning of devices (cocalled
product piracy) or intellectual property. IDs which are stored
in nonvolatile memory can often be easily cloned or mod-
ified. Hence approaches have been published to overcome
the aforementioned drawbacks. They are usually based on
unique physical properties of the single chip. For example,
such properties are caused by manufacturing process varia-
tions. The two main approaches in this context are physical
fingerprinting and the use of physical uncloneable functions
(PUFs). Former strives to identify a given circuit directly by
physical characteristics latter use physical characteristics to
perform a challenge-response authentication.
A promising technique used for both approaches is to
observe the state of uninitialized SRAM cells. When voltage
above a certain threshold is applied to an SRAM cell its initial
unstable state will change to one of two possible stable states
“0” or “1”. The probability for each stable state is heavily
dependant on small variations originated during the CMOS
fabrication process causing slight deviation in threshold
voltage inside the cells. The probability varies between
diﬀerent cells even inside a single chip thus representing a
characteristic initial memory content on power-up for each
device. Depending on the probability distribution the major
part of the memory content is stable for most of the power-
ups. Other bits having a probability around 50% show a
power-up behaviour similar to random noise. Assuming a
high rate of stable data the memory content can be used to
provide high quality identification data that is very hard to
reproduce deliberately.
Considering SRAM-based field-programmable gate
arrays (FPGAs), configuration memory or BRAM cells can
potentially be used to retrieve fingerprints from uninitialized
SRAM cells. Nevertheless this technique depends on the
availability of SRAM that is not automatically initialized to
a designated fixed value at device power-up. As a random
configuration might well lead to short circuits and therefore
damage the device physically, many vendors enforce the
clearing of configuration memory by an unavoidable
initialization phase on power-up. This is the case, for
example, for the Xilinx Virtex-5 series FPGAs considered in
this contribution. Certainly not all parts of the configuration
are so critical. Initializing SRAM cells on power-up to a
fixed value might consume additional area on the chip. Due
to area eﬃciency, there is some chance for certain regions
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in configuration memory without this kind of reset-on-
powerup procedure. The challenge is to find possibilities for
secure hardware identification without having to implement
and configure complex additional logic on the device.
In this work we present a method to retrieve identi-
fication data from the configuration memory space using
readouts from presumably unused and therefore unini-
tialized hidden address ranges. Besides description of the
method and the used tools we give statistical data from our
measurements on a population of Virtex-5 devices indicat-
ing the potential to use the memory region for identifica-
tion purposes. Moreover we demonstrate a straightforward
methodology to generate reference keys that allow for robust
identification of devices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 gives an overview of some related publications.
The situation and identification approach and the data
measurement basics are given in Section 3. The methods
for data examination are presented in Section 4. Section 5
presents the analysis results from the measurements that
are interpreted in Section 6. Also open points and poten-
tial applications are discussed in Section 6. In Section 7
we give some examples of possible security applications.
Specific properties and benefits of the used memory region
are considered in Section 8. The paper is concluded in
Section 9.
2. Related Work
As previously mentioned there exist twomain approaches for
physical identification of CMOS devices which have received
considerable attention in recent years. An introduction to
PUFs can be found, for example, in [1–4], and a collection
of related publications is given in [5]. For FPGAs also the
use of flip flops is presented in [6, 7]. PUFs implementation
as proposed in [6] is possible but it requires a specific
configuration of the device.
In the following we will focus on physical fingerprinting
based on SRAM cells. The use of fabrication process-related
variations of CMOS gates for identification has been widely
examined. Excellent identification properties show dedicated
circuits as in [8]. The use of SRAM cells (see, e.g., [9], patent
[10]) comes at the cost of more noisy data but with the
benefit of not requiring extra space on the chip. To extract
IDs and cryptographic keys from this noisy data, various
mechanisms like fuzzy extraction [11] have been proposed.
Finally a preliminary version of this work was previously
published in [12].
3. FPGA Configuration Memory and
Proposed Approach
On many current FPGA devices the used configuration
memory is initialized to a defined value at startup, rendering
the SRAM cells useless for device identification by physical
fingerprinting. We look at the Xilinx Virtex-5 series [13] as
representatives of this kind of devices. The challenge is to find
Table 1: Frame address register description (Xilinx Virtex-5).
Address type Bit index description
Block type [23:21] Used in Virtex-5: 000 up to 011.
Top B bit 20 Selects between top and bottom
Row address [19:15] Selects the current row
Column address [14:7] Selects a major column
Minor address [6:0] Selects a frame
areas in the configuration memory which are not initialized
due to not being critical for the chip integrity.
In first experiments we found, that the SRAM config-
uration cells are reliably set to zero on device power up
and can therefore not be used for identification of a single
device. Even the BRAM blocks where random content poses
no direct threat to the physical device are reliably zeroed out.
As a solution approach we looked at parts of the
configuration memory address space that are not used for
configuration and are therefore possibly not included in the
initialization process. It turned out that readout of address
ranges reserved for additional future block types other
than configurable logic, BRAMs, special frames and non-
configuration frames yielded device-specific data that can
serve for identification. We therefore looked at the address
regions oﬃcially not used, that is, the addresses starting with
a “1” in bit 23 (see Table 1).
3.1. Structure of Configuration Memory. Configuration
memory in Xilinx Virtex-5 devices is organized in frames
as smallest configurable units. All frames have an identical,
fixed length of 1312 bits, split into 41 words of 32 bits [14].
Each frame can be addressed individually using a 24-bit
address written to the Frame Address Register (FAR) of the
device. The FAR is divided into five subfields as described
in Table 1. Over several interfaces like JTAG and SelectMAP,
frames can be written for configuration and the content can
also be read out for verification.
As can be seen, the three most significant bits [23:21] are
designated for identifying the block type. The block types
used in the Virtex-5 series [14] are Interconnect and block
configuration (000), Block RAM content (001), Interconnect
and Block Special Frames (010), and Block RAM Non-
Configuration Frames (011). Not (oﬃcially) used is the
complete address range starting with MSB 1 (1xx).
3.2. Tooling. For readouting the configuration memory we
used the 1149.1 JTAG [15] configuration interface and
the readout procedure given by Xilinx [14]. A PC was
connected via Digilent USB programming cable to the FPGA
board. Based on the Digilent Port Communications Utility
(DPCUTIL) [16] Library and API we created a tool for
directly reading and writing configuration registers and data
frames based on C#. Besides simple JTAG access the tool
allows multiple readbacks and generation of some additional
data thus providing the basis of our statistical analysis. For
writing complete bitstreams to program the devices we used
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the standard Xilinx Suite v10.1, the associated programming
cables, and the iMPACT tool.
4. Examination
In this section we give some figures about the collected data.
Examination results based on this data are given in Section 5.
We looked at a total of nine Xilinx XC5VLX110T devices
[17], integrated in Digilent XUPV5-LX110T Evaluation
Platforms [18]. In the following we denote the devices with
letters A, . . . , I. Since the substructure of the address space
outside the area used for configuration is not public, we
used the autoincrementation of the FAR to determine valid
addresses. It turned out that at least 96 kbit of nontrivial
data could be read out from an unconfigured device within
a certain memory region. A block of ten consecutive frames
(13,120 bit) was chosen for closer investigation. In this paper,
we refer to this data stream consisting of 10 frames of data.
Each time we perform a readout of the device, we read these
10 frames.
For statistical examination for each device X ∈
(A, . . . ,H) two measurement series of 10,000 readouts ΘX =
(ϑ1X, . . . , ϑ
10,000
X ) each were collected, one series from the
unconfigured device (ΘiX) and one from the programmed
device (Θ
i
X). So a total of 160,000 data streams (each consists
of 10 frames) could be used for statistics and creating master
identification keys. In addition, test data TX = (τ1X , . . . , τ100X ),
resp., TX = (τ1X, . . . , τ100X ) of 100 readouts was collected
from every board setup, that is, a total of 1,600 test streams.
Eventually for the exploration of temperature stability we
made another 40000 measurements for three selected boards
D, H, and I which were exposed to a wide temperature range.
For ideal identification of devices it would be optimal to
have a bijective mapping from an ID to a physical device and
vice versa. The examination of the measurement data was
therefore done looking in two directions. First the correlation
and consistency of the diﬀerent measurements on one board
were investigated, to get a unique mapping from a device
to an ID. From each measurement series a reference data
stream as master identification key was created that serves
as a candidate for device representation. In a second step
the results from diﬀerent boards were compared aiming for
an injective mapping from one ID to one specific device.
Validation of the identification process was performed using
the test data sets and the reference IDs. The results are given
in the following paragraphs.
5. Results
5.1. Similarity and Reference Keys. First we look at the
conformity of diﬀerent readouts from the very same device
X to map each device to an ID. Therefore we used 10,000
readouts to create a frequency distribution of zeros and ones
of every bit in the data stream for each FPGA. Figures 1 and 2
show the results for two single devices. The other devices
showed similar figures.
The measurement reveals a distinct accumulation of bits
showing constantly the same value. As can be seen in Table 2
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Figure 1: Probability of bit value “1” over 10 k measurements on
device D.
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Figure 2: Probability of bit value “1” over 10 k measurements on
device F.
the number of ones dominates the number of zeros by a
factor of 1.7. The portion of flipping bits is below ten percent
ranging from 7.2% to 9.7% with a mean value of 8.4%
over the devices under consideration (see Figure 3). The
distribution of zeros and ones is pretty similar for diﬀerent
devices (Figure 3). For the very same device—configured or
unconfigured—the numbers are not identical but relatively
close to each other. These diﬀering results for one device are
more probably caused by temperature variances than by the
fact of configuration dependencies.
Figure 4 depicts the total amount of constant bits
observed over a variable number of compared readouts for
diﬀerent devices. The measurements show that more than
90% of all bits are constant over all compared readouts.
We therefore notice a distinctive coherence of measurements
from one device.
To quantify this coherence we compared the single data
streams with a reference stream ρ to get a measurable
deviation value. To achieve this we used the probability
distribution to generate a reference data stream ρ of the
measurement, setting each bit to the value with the higher
probablity of occurrence according to the measured data.
ρ therefore represents the bitwise rounded mean of all
measured streams.
We then determined the Hamming Distance (HD) of
every readout to this reference key. Figure 5 shows the
respective distribution for one device. The readouts from
one board show a close cross-correlation. For device D
the Hamming distances show an expectancy value of 99,
equivalent to only 0.75% of the total data, and a standard
deviation of 7.4. Device F gives an expectancy value of 137
(1.0%) with a standard deviation of 9.1. All HD values
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Figure 3: Mean occurrences of constant ones and zeros as well as
flipping bits of Table 2.
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Figure 4: Percentage of constant bits over 10,000 measurements for
two devices, that represent the maximum (device D) and minimum
(device F) over all devices. All other values reside in the area between
the two curves.
computed from all devices resided in an interval of [53–
208]. The analyses of the measurement series from the other
devices are in between the two extremal values given.
So far, the compared values were originated from
unconfigured devices and directly measured after startup.
For identification of the device, the key data should be
independent from the content of the address ranges of
configuration memory that are used for programming
the device. Therefore, also the programmed device was
examined. Figure 6 depicts the HD values of readouts
of a programmed board in relation to the reference key
determined on the same board in unconfigured state.
The values read out from the configured board show
a slightly higher deviation from the reference but are still
within a mean deviation of well below 1% of the total
data stream. This is also the case for the other examined
devices (see also Table 3). So all data streams from one board
show a great mutual similarity. To verify the usability of the
proposed approach, we compare in a next step data from
diﬀerent devices.
5.2. Distinction and Identification. For unique identification,
the mapping of a given ID value to a device is necessary.
Table 2: Number of constant zeros, ones, and flipping bits.
Device Ones Zeros Flipping
A 7798 59,4% 4238 32,3% 1084 8,3%
A 7744 59,0% 4190 31,9% 1186 9,0%
B 7698 58,7% 4435 33,8% 987 7,5%
B 7661 58,4% 4414 33,6% 1045 8,0%
C 7388 56,3% 4676 35,6% 1056 8,0%
C 7325 55,8% 4642 35,4% 1153 8,8%
D 7702 58,7% 4479 34,1% 939 7,2%
D 7638 58,2% 4432 33,8% 1050 8,0%
E 7626 58,1% 4350 33,2% 1144 8,7%
E 7566 57,7% 4357 33,2% 1197 9,1%
F 7517 57,3% 4418 33,7% 1185 9,0%
F 7491 57,1% 4352 33,2% 1277 9,7%
G 7498 57,1% 4577 34,9% 1045 8,0%
G 7418 56,5% 4543 34,6% 1159 8,8%
H 7537 57,4% 4543 34,6% 1040 7,9%
H 7460 56,9% 4552 34,7% 1108 8,4%
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Figure 5: Distribution of Hamming distances to the respective
reference streams for unconfigured devices D and F and 10,000
measurements each.
Here the diﬀerence between readouts of diﬀerent boards
is the crucial property. A first indicator is the diﬀerence
between the computed reference keys. Table 3 shows the
mutual Hamming distances of all reference keys.
The table shows a very close correlation between the
measurements of the same device, meaning that only a slight
dependency on the configuration state can be determined.
In contrast, HD values between diﬀerent devices are all near
6000, meaning a 45% deviation and therefore near to the
expected value of 50% for pure random streams. A closer
look at the streams revealed some bits that are constantly zero
over all measurements of all devices, which in combination
with the slight nonuniform distribution of ones and zeroes
(see Table 2) may account for the lower absolute deviation.
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Table 3: Mutual Hamming distances of reference streams from unconfigured devices A . . .G and configured devices A . . .G.
Device A A B B C C D D E E F F G G H H
A 0 90 5903 5918 6161 6151 6020 6024 6089 6118 6201 6201 5981 5973 6073 6100
A 90 0 5897 5912 6157 6147 6008 6012 6101 6130 6199 6199 5975 5967 6047 6072
B 5903 5897 0 87 6268 6276 5967 5963 5990 6011 6050 6048 6118 6128 5952 5969
B 5918 5912 87 0 6283 6291 5972 5968 5965 5980 6077 6075 6103 6113 5949 5964
C 6161 6157 6268 6283 0 74 6339 6343 6054 6053 6170 6176 6266 6250 6012 6027
C 6151 6147 6276 6291 74 0 6315 6319 6032 6031 6146 6152 6262 6246 6014 6029
D 6020 6008 5967 5972 6339 6315 0 78 5991 6010 6165 6159 5989 5991 5979 6000
D 6024 6012 5963 5968 6343 6319 78 0 5997 6016 6135 6129 5977 5979 5993 6014
E 6089 6101 5990 5965 6054 6032 5991 5997 0 113 6088 6092 6032 6024 6042 6079
E 6118 6130 6011 5980 6053 6031 6010 6016 113 0 6101 6105 6041 6033 6039 6080
F 6201 6199 6050 6077 6170 6146 6165 6135 6088 6101 0 30 6194 6198 6108 6135
F 6201 6199 6048 6075 6176 6152 6159 6129 6092 6105 30 0 6188 6192 6098 6125
G 5981 5975 6118 6103 6266 6262 5989 5977 6032 6041 6194 6188 0 58 6080 6077
G 5973 5967 6128 6113 6250 6246 5991 5979 6024 6033 6198 6192 58 0 6086 6085
H 6073 6047 5952 5949 6012 6014 5979 5993 6042 6039 6108 6098 6080 6086 0 119
H 6100 6072 5969 5964 6027 6029 6000 6014 6079 6080 6135 6125 6077 6085 119 0
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Figure 6: Distribution of Hamming distances to the device D
reference stream ρD (generated from the unconfigured device data
ΘD) for 1000 test data streams from the unconfigured (TX =
(τ1X, . . . , τ
1000
X )) and configured (TX = (τ1X, . . . , τ1000X )) device each.
Figure 8 shows the comparison of the test value set
from device D with all reference strings. Two distinctive
peak clusters are visible in the chart. Two peaks with
relatively small average Hamming weights of about 160
originate from the comparison with the two reference sets
ρD (unconfigured) and ρD (configured) from the same board
D (see Figure 7 for an enlarged view). The remaining 14
peaks belong to reference values of the other devices and are
clustered in a narrow interval around an HD of 6000. Figures
7 and 9 detail the two interesting intervals rescaled for better
visibility.
The charts show a clear separation of matching and non-
matching devices with diﬀerences in the Hamming distance
of more than an order of magnitude. The results for the other
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Figure 7: Enlarged presentation of the Hamming distance distribu-
tion of TD relative to ρD and ρD.
devices are very similar and also provide recognition rates of
100% using very simple threshold algorithms.
5.3. Temperature Stability. So far all measurements have
been made at standard laboratory conditions including a
regular temperature of app. 25◦C. In diverse applications the
temperature of the FPGA may vary in some range around
this temperature. In order to ensure applicability of our
approach some independability of temperatures must be
proven. For this we selected three diﬀerent boards D, F, and
I and exposed these to diﬀerent temperatures ranging from
−30◦C to +80◦C in a climate chamber.
The first experiment conducted was to determine the
variation of the fingerprint at diﬀerent temperatures. This
was done by reading back the device 1000 times and building
a master bitstream out of this measurement. Then each
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Figure 9: Enlarged presentation of the Hamming distance distribution of TD relative to ρX and ρX for X /=D.
bitstream is compared to the master. Representative results
are depicted in Figures 10, 11, and 12 for the mean value
of 20◦C and both extrema −30◦C and +80◦C. The mean
hamming distance varies for about 40 bits depending on
the temperature, what is quite a moderate value, having
in mind a nonmatching HD of about 6000. Moreover
for diﬀerent temperatures the curves look quite similar.
Interestingly there is no common temperature-dependent
behavior. While in Figure 11 the standard temperature has
the smallest variation and the lowest temperature the highest
one, the situation changes for the second board, where
the lowest temperature has the lowest variation and the
highest temperature the highest one. Actually this is the
behavior we expected before our experiments. However the
situation reverses for board D in Figure 12. So we can only
conclude that there is some slight variation with diﬀerent
temperatures.
In our second experiment we compared the measure-
ments taken at diﬀerent temperatures to the reference
bitstream generated from the readbacks at 20◦C. The
results for Board H are depicted in Figure 13. Results for
other boards look similar. Obviously the comparison shows
optimum results for 20◦C. For all other measurements we
get a rising hamming distance with greater temperature
diﬀerences for both measurements. Again the form of the
curves remains similar which again means the variance of
the hamming distances are almost equal. The maximum
hamming distance goes up to around 300 for the highest
and lowest temperatures which is very moderate compared
to non matching hamming distances.
The third experiment is a temperature sweep, starting at
85◦C and cooling down to −30◦C. This process took about
40min, and 4800 measurements were taken with 500ms
between each measurement. Out of all measurements a
master bitstream was built and the hamming distance for
each readback calculated. The results are shown in Figure 14.
At the beginning the hamming distance is around 350, goes
down to 120 at approximately 0◦C, and then goes up again
with even more decreasing temperature. The blue line shows
the chip temperature which is around 5 to 10◦ higher than
the surrounding temperature for an unconfigured Virtex-5
device.
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Figure 10: Hamming distance of single readback and master
bitstream of board H at diﬀerent temperatures.
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Figure 11: Hamming distance of single readback and masterbit-
stream of board I at diﬀerent temperatures.
One can conclude that our device identification mecha-
nism shows slight temperature dependency, which does not
influence the identification process. In a final experiment we
used the 20◦C master bitstreams for non matching devices
at diﬀerent temperatures. For such non matching devices the
temperature has almost no influence, resulting in a deviation
of about 20 in the hamming distance. Related to an absolute
hamming distance of around 6000 this is neglectable. So
finally device recognition is feasible for a wide temperature
range.
5.4. Aging. Another important aspect is device aging. Again,
we have to point out we do not know what information
exactly is read from the device by our methodology. However
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Figure 12: Hamming distance of single readback and masterbit-
stream of board D at diﬀerent temperatures.
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Figure 13: Matching device identification with master bitstream
generated at 20◦C and identification readback temperature range
from−30◦C to +80◦C (1 kmeasurements at each temperature step).
we did a readback for diﬀerent devices with a time diﬀerence
of one year. The master bitstream generated one year ago was
applied to the readback. Figure 15 shows the result for device
H. One can see a slight deviation between both devices.
The diﬀerence might be based on some aging of the device,
but also slight deviations in the environment cannot be
completely ruled out. However this eﬀect is relatively small
and does not aﬀect the identification mechanism presented
in this paper.
6. Discussion
The examination shows a very high correlation within data
streams from a single device. Test data revealed deviations
from the reference master around 1% of the total data
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Figure 14: 4800 hamming distance measurements taken during
temperature sweep from 85◦C to −30◦C environmental tempera-
ture. The blue curve shows the chip temperature.
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Figure 15: Two device identification measurements taken with one
year between 1st and 2nd measurement.
stream. On the other hand comparison to reference keys
from other devices resulted in HD values corresponding to
a deviation in more than 40% of the bits enabling a reliable
identification of the device being read out. In addition
the identification technique needs no configuration on the
device and therefore no area on the configurable fabric
or other hardware resources. We therefore believe that the
method can be used to securely and reliably identify physical
devices.
An open issue is the question where the data originates
from in the first place. Since the address space is not used
oﬃcially on the devices it could as well be omitted. So it
is possible that the readback retrieves data from memory
locations that are in fact used for some purpose. On the
other side there are the distinct diﬀerences between diﬀerent
instances of the same device model and the Hamming
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Figure 16: Number of single bit value changes for the diﬀerent bit
indices over 10,000 measurements on device D.
distances near the expectancy values for random strings.
This seems to be unlikely for deliberately configured data.
Nevertheless we are so far not able to determine the precise
origin of the readout data. In addition the data shows slight
repetitive patterns as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 that have
to be analysed to get valid statements about the number of
usable identification bits.
Moreover the question arises whether the data could also
be used to generate random numbers. Here not the constant
but the variable bits are crucial for the quality. Figures 1
and 2 already show that the data have diﬀerent distribution
depending on the bit index. Figure 16 shows in addition
the number of value changes over the measured set of data
streams for the diﬀerent bit indices.
The variety of behaviours of the diﬀerent bits could be
seen as an indication that an extraction of random numbers
could be possible, but further analysis and postprocessing of
the data is needed to get reliable results.
7. Security Applications
There are several possible applications for the described
SRAM-based PUFs. Since the PUF consists of memory
values, it is easy to evaluate also for an attacker. Hence it
should be possible to create the memory response without
the specific device but only a readout of the memory. A
security application therefore has to make sure that the PUF
is actually evaluated and not replayed values are used. One
possibility for that is guaranteed direct physical access to
the device. This is utilized in two applications examplarily
looked at in the following: product piracy protection and IP
protection.
For the first use case, the initial memory content is
read out at production of the device and an adequate
error correcting coding mechanism is applied to create a
stable fingerprint. This fingerprint is then used to create
a manufacturer certificate for the device, for example, by
signing a hash value of the fingerprint with a manufacturer-
specific secret key. This certificate is then delivered together
with the device to the customer who is then able to verify
whether he acquired a genuine device since amanufacturer of
bogus devices is neither able to create valid certificates for his
device nor to clone the PUF-fingerprints for the cloned units.
Since the fingerprinting does not rely on memory regions
used for configuration the verification can be performed
even during operation without interruption and without
need to restart the device.
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Possible applications for the considered identification
mechanism are not restricted to external evaluation of a
device but could as well be used inside a configuration
bitstream itself. This is considered in the second use case for
IP protection. Since the configuration memory is accessible
from the fabric through the common ICAP interface, a con-
figured bitstream could easily use the available information
to identify the device it is configured on and perhaps react
accordingly. A straightforward application would be to bind
a configuration to a specific device. To show feasibility we
implemented the basic functionality.
Using an ICAP interface connected to a MicroBlaze
System we were able to read out the identifying data from
within the device, getting similar results as when using
the external JTAG access. By comparing the data with a
reference string stored in the configuration bitstream, the
design can verify whether it is run on a predefined device. If
a mismatch is detected, an internal enforcement mechanism
can, for example, disable the design or reduce functionality,
building a reliable copy protection mechanism for hardware
configuration IP.
8. Specific Properties of the Memory Region
When the identification is used for policy enforcement and
copy protection, circumventing the identification could be
of interest for possible attackers. In the classical use case
using memory cells for identification it has to be guaranteed
that the cells are read out before any influence on the
contents is possible, since the memory cells can easily be
written with arbitrary values. In contrast to that we observed
that writing on the considered addresses was not possible
over the examined interfaces—the readout values were not
changeable by write attempts. This is a major benefit in
contrast to general memory cells.
In addition, since the used cells are outside the memory
space used for configuration, we assume that they are not
used for programming a design to the chip. The identifica-
tion should therefore work also for configured devices during
runtime and for partial bitstreams having no control and
no information about the contents of the surrounding chip
area or even about their own placing on the area as long
as they have access to the ICAP interface. So no area has
to be reserved for the identification and no constraints for
placement and routing are imposed by the approach.
9. Conclusion and Further Work
For the challenge of identifying physical devices of Xilinx
Virtex-5 FPGA family we examined configuration memory
readouts from address ranges that are assumedly not used
in the series. We chose an address range reserved for future
block types to read out data and compared the readouts
mutually from one device and between devices. Results
showed a strong coherence of diﬀerent streams from the
same device and strong deviations between devices. This
holds true also for a wide temperature range. Moreover we
showed device identification is feasible after one year of
aging. We therefore assume the data suitable for identifica-
tion of physical devices. The method opens identification
possibilities for FPGA series where other SRAM-based
approaches fail because of enforced initialization to defined
values at startup.
To proof reliable identification some future work is
necessary. So far it is not clear how long the potential key
sequences are and in what ratio they include real identifi-
cation information and noise. It could also be investigated,
whether it is also applicable to devices of other series.
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